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Abstract: Despite the growing body of research on authoritarian regimes, few studies address the issues of their 
legitimization through exaggerating external threats and constructing enemy images. Targeting the gap in the 
literature, this article explores the discursive strategies of ‘evilization’ and demonization of the ‘other’, with a focus 
on their implications for legitimating and sustaining the authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet space. Examining the 
cases of Russia and Azerbaijan, the qualitative, comparative analysis presented in this article uncovers a series of 
essential similarities between the regimes’ legitimization strategies. Findings suggest that there has been a strong 
tendency in both Russian and Azerbaijani discourses to ‘externalize’ major problems facing the countries and 
scapegoat ‘evil forces’ as their main causes. Frequent appeals to the external threats have been accompanied by a 
heightened emphasis on the necessity of strong presidential power, with ‘strongmen’ that are capable of 
withstanding the enemies’ conspiracies. Remarkably, one of the core similarities between the two regimes is their 
unstoppable drive towards monarchical presidencies. 
 
Keywords: Russia; Azerbaijan; Authoritarian Regimes; Enemy Images; Legitimation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Even though the survival strategies of the authoritarian and hybrid regimes in post-
Soviet countries have been extensively studied, there has been little attention to the 
legitimation of rulers through the construction of the enemy images and external threats. This 
study represents an attempt to fill the void, by examining the cases of Russia and Azerbaijan 
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during Vladimir Putin‟s (2012-present) and Ilham Aliyev‟s (2003-present) presidencies, 
respectively. The two cases were selected to ensure variance along relevant dimensions of 
analysis, in order to examine the differences between post-Soviet authoritarian regimes when 
it comes to legitimation strategies through the enemy images and external threats. We have 
selected two post-communist countries, the transition of which has been marred by a series 
of authoritarian malpractices, ranging from centralization and personalization of power to 
extensive crackdown on civil liberties and political freedoms (Freedom House2019a). One of 
the core similarities between the two regimes is their unstoppable drive towards monarchical 
presidencies with hyper-presidents – endowed with unlimited power. 
The Arab Awakening, which deposed some of the world‟s longest-standing autocratic 
rulers, showed that the autocrats are becoming increasingly vulnerable to youth-driven, 
social media-powered societies. Thus, both Russian and Azerbaijani „strongmen‟ are tasked 
with sustaining their regime stability, not least through the construction of external threats. 
The article contributes to the bulk of literature on the legitimation strategies of the 
authoritarian regimes. It analyzes the representation of the enemy images in Russian and 
Azerbaijani presidents‟ discourses, with a focus on their functions in terms of legitimating and 
sustaining the authoritarian rule in the two countries. Based on these observations, this article 
seeks to address the question: how have dissimilar authoritarian regimes sought to engender 
domestic legitimacy through the construction of external threats and enemy images? 
The study relies on critical discourse analysis to explore the core narratives that the 
Russian and Azerbaijani presidents have employed in the representation of the „Other‟. The 
study relies on observations from political speeches, newspaper articles, official documents 
and interviews which provide a body of discourse.  
 
UNDERSTANDING LEGITIMATION AND ENEMY IMAGES IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
 
Legitimacy is frequently associated with regime survival, given that it functions as an 
alternative resource of support for incumbents in turbulent times (Mazepus et al. 2016, 352). 
Lipset (1959) defines legitimacy as the “the capacity of a political system to engender and 
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper 
ones for the society” (p. 86). Authoritarian legitimacy has attracted a lot of academic attention 
and is largely viewed as something critical that non-democratic rulers seek to acquire or 
develop through their legitimation claims, symbols, and narratives (Dukalskis and Gerschewski 
2017, 253). Huntington (1991) notes that Western democratic systems are less dependent on 
performance legitimacy than authoritarian systems, as failure is blamed on the incumbents 
instead of the system, and the ouster and replacement of the incumbents help to renew the 
system (p. 27). Moreover, the rulers in authoritarian regimes tend to rely heavily on external 
sources of legitimation, not least through appealing to enemy images and “accusing outside 
forces of causing every problem that arises on the domestic front” (Shakrai 2015, 33). 
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Middens note that “the threat of enemies justifies actions that might otherwise be 
unacceptable or illegal (...) Enemies serve as a focus for aggression and as a means of 
diverting attention from pressing internal problems” (Middens 1990). One of the most 
frequently observed functions of the enemy images is the potential to mobilize for or against 
an idea or a specific group. Indeed, the mobilizing power of the enemies and external threats 
would potentially have legitimizing and justifying effects on a government‟s even most 
disputed and unpopular policies. The “rhetoric of insecurity” suggested by Cambell seems to 
accurately capture the basic functions of the enemy images. According to this rhetoric, the 
state policies are legitimized through the attempt to instill notions of insecurity (Campbell 
1998). 
To trigger the emotions of fear, the enemy must be portrayed as aggressive, 
dangerous, threatening, immoral and unreliable. In effect, enemy images and related 
stereotypes are often characterized by the claim that the enemy has aggressive and evil 
intentions and is led by a centralized and monolithic leadership that would be capable of 
carrying out intricate conspiracies (Hermann 2003, 289). The „evilization‟ is inherently linked 
to one of the most frequently observed functions of the enemy images – mobilization of 
population against the „Other‟ (Shakrai 2015, 34).This has much to do with the rally-around- 
the-flag effect that can generate long-lasting public support - conducive to sustaining 
authoritarian regimes. 
To give an idea of the rally-around-the-flag effect, it is noteworthy that the escalation 
of conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have been positively correlated with 
Putin‟s growing popularity despite the crippling Western sanctions. This is where the 
legitimizing effects of the enemy image come into play, with Putin‟s appeals to external 
threats helping boost his popularity amid severe economic downturns. A question arises as to 
what discursive strategies the Russian and Azerbaijani authoritarian rulers use to „evilize‟ the 
enemies and laud the great job that they do standing up to it.  
 
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE „OTHER‟ IN RUSSIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
 
There is a broad consensus among the students of Russian politics about the essential 
features of the Russian regime-centered around „putinism‟. The latter is viewed as a form 
autocratic rule that is personalistic, conservative and populist (Fish 2017, 61). The fact that 
Russian president Vladimir Putin‟s recent efforts at tailoring the Russian Constitution to his re-
election have not run into public resistance, suggests that „putinism‟ remains significantly 
popular with Russians. A question arises as to what specific factors are maintaining Putin‟s 
popularity amid excessive crackdown on civil liberties and political freedoms across Russia 
(Freedom House, 2019a). 
It has not been uncommon for Putin to legitimate his regime through exaggerating 
external threats, emanating particularly from the West. Moreover, the escalation of the crisis 
in Ukraine has been positively correlated with the „othering‟ of the West in Kremlin‟s 
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discourse. Some of the characteristics attributed to Western governments by Putin include 
hypocrisy, Russophobia, lack of moral integrity, recklessness, etc. (Szostek and Hutchings 
2015, 185). Clearly, the relationship between Moscow and Washington has reached its nadir 
since the end of the Cold War, and by December 2014 the concept of an „iron curtain‟, 
separating East and West was again put forward, at least in some analyst circles. Igor Ivanov, 
Putin‟s first foreign minister, even suggested that the crisis in Ukraine is more dangerous than 
the Cold War, as there still is no mutually acceptable mechanism to prevent military clashes 
(Black and Johns 2016, 227). Furthermore, Putin would regard the „coup d’état‟ in Ukraine as a 
manifestation of a deeper issue of the resurgence of „nazism‟ and „fascism‟ in Europe: “those 
who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine resorted to terror, murder and riots. 
Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue 
to set the tone in Ukraine to this day” (Kremlin 2014). The references to the revival of fascism 
would be followed by the claim that as a pivotal actor in defeating fascism through World 
War II, Russia had a crucial mission of preventing its resurgence in Europe. 
Interestingly, some Russian analysts tend to claim that Cold War thinking never went 
away from Western perceptions of international relations, and even see that as part of the 
crisis outbreak in Ukraine (Black and Johns 2016). Consistent with such contentions, Putin has 
tended to accuse the USA of the devastation unleashed on Ukraine. In Putin‟s words, 
Washington‟s goal is to „remake the whole world‟ around its own interests and thus to 
impose a „unilateral diktat‟ on the rest of the world. Therefore, the crisis in Ukraine was 
framed an unsurprising consequence of the United States and NATO‟s hostile and anti-
Russian policies. They “continue their policy of expanding NATO. What for?” (Washington 
post 2015).  
While blaming the devastating crisis on the United States the Kremlin has tended to 
contend that fomenting instability in Ukraine is a part of policy that aims to drive a wedge 
between the two brotherly nations. Moreover, Putin has repeatedly stated that “Russians and 
Ukrainians are one people” (Trenin 2018).  Thus, the Kremlin‟s discourse suggests that had not 
the United States of America and European Union made every effort to undermine the 
Russian-Ukrainian relations, there would have been no considerable frictions between the 
two brotherly nations. Putin has invariably accused the United States and European Union of 
their inherently anti-Russian policies, manifested particularly in their double standards on 
Crimea‟s „self-determination‟. “We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe 
that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? (…) 
This is not even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism” (Kremlin 2014).   
Along with activating the Cold War narratives and stereotypes associated with the United 
States and its policy towards Russia, it has not been uncommon for Putin to treat Washington 
as „intellectually inferior‟ and „reckless‟ that suffers from „imperial adventurism‟ and lacks 
strategic foresight. This specifically applies to „reckless‟ sanctions imposed on Russia that 
among others, undermined trust in the dollar as the world's universal currency. "It's a typical 
mistake of an empire” said Putin and concluded that with its countless strategic mistakes; the 
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USA is accelerating the end of its global dominance (Abc news 2018). Essentially, by pointing 
to the acute threats emanating from the USA, he would strive to trigger rally-around-the-flag 
effect across the Russian population and focus their attention on the necessity of defeating 
the „dangerous‟ but „reckless‟ rival. 
Moreover, the pronounced emphasis on standing up to the West has served as a 
convenient pretext to suppress dissent and pluralism across the two country by labeling civic 
and opposition activists as “anti-Russian spies,” or “foreign agents,” “traitors,” who are 
involved in the “Western conspiracies” (Yablokov 2018). 
Beyond all these, Putin has tended to undermine the very idea of political opposition, 
by implicitly representing it as an anti-state force backed by anti-Russian forces. Namely, in 
response to a question about opposition leader Alexei Navalny, Putin stated that Russians 
“do not want second edition of today‟s Ukraine for Russia” (France24 2017). As noted earlier, 
the Russian President would frame the Maidan Revolution as a sign of „fascism revival‟.  Such 
examples would help point to the hypothetical future of a strong opposition that would soon 
or late become a „foreign agent‟ and cause instability. It turns out that considerable part of 
Russian population tends to share Putin‟s stances on opposition. Remarkably, a Levada-
Centre survey on the necessity of political opposition shows that around 54 percent of 
respondents thought Russia needed one, while a quarter found it obsolete (Levada 2016). 
The reasons given by the second group come down to fears about internal divisions and 
instability that a strong opposition can cause (Levada 2016).  
The escalation of conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea produced rally-
around-the-flag effect, since Putin‟s approval rating increased to over 85 despite Western 
crippling economic sanctions (Terzyan 2020). Frequent appeals to the external threats have 
been accompanied by a heightened emphasis on the necessity of strong presidential power, 
with a „strongman‟, who can withstand the enemy‟s conspiracies. This discourse has reached 
a point, where Putin‟s stay in office is perceived as essential for defending national 
borderlines. Not surprisingly, in March Russia's Constitutional Court approved amendments 
that could enable Putin to stay in power for another 16 years.  
 
THE IMAGE OF THE ENEMY IN AZERBAIJANI DISCOURSE 
 
As a typical authoritarian state, Azerbaijan‟s political system is characterized by 
centralization of power and personalistic leadership, as well as weak opposition and massive 
crackdown on civil liberties and political freedoms (Freedom House, 2019b). Meanwhile, the 
existence of the external enemy helps President Ilham Aliyev further consolidate his power 
and justify his undemocratic practices. The long-standing Nagorno Karabakh conflict has 
been pivotal in targeting Armenia as Azerbaijan‟s clearly identifiable enemy in Azerbaijani 
political thinking and public consciousness. One of the most salient features of Azerbaijani 
President‟s discourse on Armenia, is the latter‟s demonization and „evilization‟. Some of the 
adjectives that Aliyev has used in describing the enemy image of Armenia are “barbarian,” 
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“vandal,” “aggressor,” and even a “fascist state”: “Armenia is a fascist state. Their national 
ideology is fascism, discrimination and nationalism” (Azatutyun2014). An integral part of 
Armenia‟s „evilization‟ has been its representation as bellicose, belligerent and destructive, 
which is liable for „freezing‟ Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution and causing instability.  The 
“main threat to regional security is posed by the aggressive policy of Armenia against 
Azerbaijan” (Aliyev 2014). 
Nevertheless, the enemy has been framed as „weak‟ and „inferior‟, that was able to 
„occupy‟ “Azerbaijani lands as a result of foreign intervention” (Elibegova et al. 2018, 7). 
Moreover, the assertion that Armenia is supported by Russia tends to get invoked as a 
justification for not wiping “weak,” “immoral,” “fascist,” enemy off the face of the earth 
(Elibegova et al. 2018). In order to mobilize the Azerbaijani society against the „evil‟ enemy 
and thus legitimate his power, the Azerbaijani President has portrayed Armenia as a „fake 
state‟ built on historical Azerbaijani lands. Such claims have called for unity and patriotism in 
order to overpower the „occupant‟ enemy and restore „historical justice‟: “Azerbaijanis will 
return to Nagorno Karabakh, to other occupied lands and to all the historical Azerbaijani 
lands” (Massispost 2014).  
Consistent with authoritarian rulers‟ rhetoric, Aliyev has placed a heightened emphasis 
on military power, thus preparing ground for large-scale militarization. Aliyev‟s discourse 
suggests that Azerbaijan‟s military superiority will be critical to overpowering Armenia. “We 
will continue to build up our military capabilities. The weaponry and ammunition we have 
acquired in recent years suggest that we can accomplish any task” (Azernews 2014). Such a 
rhetoric is typical of personalistic regimes, in which the rules strive to build a „strongman‟ 
image through exaggerating external threats and simultaneously emphasizing their personal 
characteristics that make them more likely to use military force against the dangerous enemy 
(Weeks 2012, 326). It is noteworthy, that conspiracy narratives have been strongly associated 
with the representation of the enemy image of Armenia. The Azerbaijani leadership has 
strived to create an image of an anti-Azerbaijani, evil and aggressive Armenian lobby, which 
allegedly conspires to damage or undermine the Azerbaijani statehood: “Our political weight 
and economic power are growing. (…) Still, there are ill-wishing forces who do not love us. 
They can be divided into several groups. First, our main enemies are the Armenians from all 
over the world and the hypocritical, corrupt and bribe-taker politicians who are under their 
influence” (President.az 2012). Furthermore, the „externalization‟ of domestic problems and 
exaggeration of the enemy image in Aliyev‟s discourse reached a point, where he accused 
the Armenian lobby, the scope of whose influence he said „is quite broad‟ of the continuing 
international criticism of Azerbaijan‟s abysmal human rights record: “An information war is 
waged against us (…) The Armenian lobby is especially active in that information war. 
Attempts to badmouth Azerbaijan, to deny Azerbaijan‟s realities, to present Azerbaijan to the 
outside world as a backward and undemocratic country primarily result from dirty deeds of 
the Armenian lobby” (Asbarez 2012).  
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It follows that the Armenian lobby is the reason why international watchdog groups, 
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch condemn severe human right 
violations in Azerbaijan. Clearly, the target audience of such statements is the Azerbaijani 
population, while the core message is that even if the enemy is „weak‟ and „inferior‟, the 
Armenian lobby still poses acute threats to Azerbaijan. 
Even the 2018 „Velvet Revolution‟ that would be largely framed as a major democratic 
milestone in Armenia, left the Azerbaijani leadership‟s hard line stances on the enemy intact. 
Overall, the „evilization‟ and demonization of the enemy is consistent with an authoritarian 
regime‟s efforts at mobilizing society and sustaining their power through external threats and 
the enemy image. The latter, as noted earlier, helps divert attention from domestic socio-
economic and political problems and scapegoat the enemy for all troubles.  
Furthermore, the necessity of standing up to the external enemy serves as a 
convenient pretext to suppress dissent and pluralism across the country by labeling 
opposition activists as „spies‟, „traitors‟ who are involved in the enemy‟s conspiracies  (Terzyan 
2016, 71-72). Frequent appeals to the external threats have been accompanied by a strong 
emphasis on the necessity of strong, presidential power, with a „strongman‟, capable of 
withstanding enemy‟s „conspiracies‟. 
Unsurprisingly, the referendum held in Azerbaijan in 2009 resulted in abolishing of 
presidential term limits. Freedom House reports point to widespread suppression of pluralism 
and a strong tendency of curbing the freedom of speech and controlling the media narrative 
on politically sensitive issues across the country (Freedom House 2019b). Namely, the legal 
amendments passed in 2017 tightened government‟s grip on online media, allowing blocking 
of websites without a court order if deemed to contain content posing a danger to the state 
or society (Freedom House 2019b). 
Overall, Azerbaijan has been evolving into a „petro-state‟ (countries immensely reliant 
on oil revenues), which often maintain domestic stability by using petrodollars to fund social 
programs and a strong state security apparatus (Demkiv 2012). Some observers note that 
petroleum has already made the incumbent authorities rich and powerful enough to address 
any challenge to their hold on power (Guliyev 2009). Studies show that oil and gas account 
for about 75% of state revenue and around 35% of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Reuters 2019). Oil revenues have become a crucial factor in sustaining Aliyev‟s regime-based 
on a system that distributes rents from oil exports through a patronage network in order to 
ensure unwavering support of allies and major clientelist groups (Guliyev 2009). 
Nevertheless, oil-addicted Azerbaijan is highly vulnerable to the fluctuations of 
international oil prices and tends to find itself in complete economic disarray as the oil prices 
drop. Unsurprisingly, the Azerbaijani economy got damaged severely in the face of tumbling 
oil prices in 2016, when prices fell below $30 a barrel. This sparked huge economic discontent 
with rising food prices and deteriorating economic conditions in Azerbaijan as a result of oil 
price spikes. Along with violently crushing the protests, the Azerbaijani authorities would pull 
out the „enemy card‟ to distract attention from pressing internal problems (BBC 2016).  
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The situation came to a head in April, 2016, resulting in the outbreak of heavy fighting 
between Azerbaijani and Armenian and Armenian armed forces, now known as the „April 
War‟ or „Four-Day War‟, in which at least 200 died (Jardine 2018).The „April war‟ was well 
predicted by a well-informed observer, suggesting that the persisting turmoil might well 
prompt the authorities to „play the Karabakh card‟ by starting either large or small operation 
as a recipe for downplaying the economic hardships and rallying Azerbaijanis around the flag 
(De Waal 2016). This is where the appeals to external threats and enemy images come into 
play to produce rally-around-the-flag effects, thus shielding the authorities from mounting 
public outrage caused by economic downturns.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article contributes to existing literature on the representation and functions of 
enemy images in authoritarian regimes by examining the cases of Russia and Azerbaijan. 
Based on the previous discussion, there are several concluding observations to make 
regarding the „othering‟ and regime legitimation strategies in Russian and Azerbaijani political 
discourses.  
Both in Russian and Azerbaijani discourses there have been a propensity to accuse 
the enemies of causing major problems facing the countries. The escalation of the crisis in 
Ukraine has been positively correlated with the „othering‟ of the West in Kremlin‟s discourse. 
Putin‟s discourse has been characterized by a strong tendency to blame the outbreak of the 
Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the West and primarily on the United States – repeatedly 
accused of anti-Russian policies, aimed to „remake the whole world‟ around its own interests.  
Similarly, Azerbaijan‟s clearly identifiable enemy Armenia has been framed as 
destructive, belligerent and bellicose, that causes instability and devastation, by „freezing‟ the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution.  
The „Others‟ have been „evilized‟ and demonized in both Russian and Azerbaijani 
discourses. Some of the characteristics attributed to Western governments by Putin include 
hypocrisy, Russophobia, lack of moral integrity and recklessness. Moreover, the Kremlin has 
framed the Ukrainian crisis as a struggle against „fascism‟, as those who staged the Maidan 
Revolution were labeled as nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites.  
The references to the „revival of fascism‟ would be followed by the claim, that Russia 
had a crucial mission of preventing its resurgence in Europe.  
As for the „evilization‟ of Azerbaijan‟s enemy, it is noteworthy that some of the 
adjectives that Aliyev has used in describing the enemy image of Armenia are „barbarian‟, 
„vandal‟, „occupant‟ and „aggressor‟, and even a „fascist state‟. The „evilization‟ and 
demonization of the enemy has rhetorically necessitated the use military force against „the 
evil‟. In order to mobilize the Azerbaijani society against the „evil‟ enemy and legitimate his 
power, the Azerbaijani President has portrayed Armenia as a „fake state‟ built on historical 
Azerbaijani lands.  
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Such claims have called for unity and patriotism in order to overpower the „occupant‟ 
enemy and restore „historical justice‟. Both Russian and Azerbaijani leaderships have 
consistently strived to trigger rally-around-the-flag effect through the construction of the 
external threats and the enemy images. Remarkably, the escalation of conflict in Ukraine and 
the annexation of Crimea have been positively correlated with Putin‟s growing popularity 
despite the crippling Western sanctions. 
As a typical petro-state Azerbaijan is highly vulnerable to the fluctuations of 
international oil prices and tends to find itself in complete economic disarray as the oil prices 
drop. This is where the appeals to external threats and enemy images come into play thus 
shielding the authorities from public outrage caused by economic downturn. 
The necessity of standing up to the enemy has served as a convenient pretext to 
suppress dissent and pluralism across the two countries by labeling opposition activists as 
„spies‟, „foreign agents‟, „traitors‟ who are involved in the enemies‟ conspiracies. Such rhetoric 
is not uncommon in authoritarian regimes, where leaders tend to strengthen their popularity 
by exaggerating external threats and exploiting nationalism. 
Frequent appeals to the external threats have been accompanied by a heightened 
emphasis on the necessity of strong presidential power, with „strongmen‟, who are capable of 
withstanding the enemies‟ conspiracies. Not surprisingly, one of the core similarities between 
the two regimes is their unstoppable drive towards monarchical presidencies. Further 
research is essential to account for Russian and Azerbaijani incumbents‟ evolving strategies of 
sustaining power through external threats and enemy images. 
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